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THE RIGHT OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY – THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF 
‘ASSEMBLY’ IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
 
Abstract Informed by the ‘assembly’ jurisprudence of the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, this article addresses elemental questions about the 
meaning and scope of ‘assembly’ in Article 21 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In seeking to determine when the right of 
peaceful assembly might properly be engaged, the article explores the inter-
relationship of assembly with expression and association and proposes a 
definition of ‘assembly’ – for the purposes of its protection – as ‘an intentional 
gathering by two or more people (including in private and online/virtual 
spaces).’ Such definitional reflection is particularly timely in light of the Human 
Rights Committee’s drafting of General Comment No 37 on Article 21. 
 






The right of peaceful assembly, enshrined in Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR),1 is persistently under strain. Those seeking to assemble face 
manifest challenges – whether in Turkey, Sudan, France or Chile, or in Hong Kong, Catalonia 
or Kashmir. Such challenges include the arbitrary arrest of assembly participants, the 
disproportionate use of force to disperse assemblies designated as ‘unlawful’ and the 
imposition of excessive liability on assembly organizers – including through measures 
ostensibly introduced to fight ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’.2 But focusing on over-zealous 
regulation neglects the logically prior question of the nature of protection conferred by this 
fundamental right – what is an ‘assembly’ and what activities does the right of peaceful 
assembly actually protect? 
Regional bodies – in particular, the European Court of Human Rights – have been at the 
forefront of interpreting the scope of the right of peaceful assembly.3 The Strasbourg Court’s 
pioneering assembly jurisprudence has repeatedly emphasized that this right (under Article 11 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) ‘is a fundamental right in a democratic 
society’, ‘one of the foundations of such a society’ and ‘should not be interpreted restrictively.’4 
The Court has generally accepted a wide range of different types of assembly as falling within 
 
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). The right of peaceful assembly is also protected in key regional human rights 
treaties, namely the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) Art 11; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter) Art 11; and the 
American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969) (ACHR) Art 15. 
2 Similarly, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Situation of Human Rights 
Defenders, Hina Jilani’ (13 August 2007) UN Doc A/62/225, para 20. 
3 European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1st edn, 
31 August 2019); European Court of Human Rights, Guide on the case-law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights Mass protests (1st edn, 29 February 2020). 
4 Eg Chumak v Ukraine, Application No 44529/09, Judgment of 6 March 2018, para 36. 
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the protective scope of Article 11, from vehicular ‘drive-slows’5 to ‘flash mobs’6 and pedestrian 
‘walkabouts’7 and from ‘night shift’ occupations of privately-owned buildings8 to tent 
encampments in urban centres.9 
Strikingly little academic attention, however, has been paid to the assembly jurisprudence 
of the UN Human Rights Committee – and more specifically, to tracing the protective scope 
of Article 21 ICCPR. As Manfred Nowak has noted, ‘the term “assembly” is not defined but 
rather presumed in the Covenant.’10 Indeed, the Human Rights Committee has not attempted 
to define ‘assembly’ in its jurisprudence but has instead shown an openness to the different 
(albeit not especially diverse) forms of assembly that have so far been raised before it.11 Of 
central importance is the Committee’s work in drafting General Comment No 37 on Article 
21.12 This work has catalysed debate within and beyond the Committee about the elements of 
a definition of assembly.  
As an authoritative legal interpretation of Article 21,13 a key function of the General 
Comment will be to ‘give some substantive content to’ this right.14 While the Committee has 
suggested that its General Comment 34 (on freedom of expression under Article 19 of the 
Covenant) ‘also provides guidance with regard to elements of Article 21’,15 that document 
neither addresses the meaning of ‘assembly’ nor elucidates its autonomous value. As such, the 
drafting of General Comment No 37 is long overdue.16 It is an initiative that offers the 
Committee an opportunity to consolidate and systematize the principles established in its 
jurisprudence and to elaborate on aspects of law and practice about which it has expressed 
concern in its Concluding Observations on State reports.17 General Comments must also be 
future-proofed insofar as possible – squarely addressing factors that are likely to shape or 
 
5 Barraco v France, Application No 31684/05, Judgment of 3 March 2009. 
6 Obote v Russia, Application No 58954/09, Judgment of 19 November 2019. 
7 Navalnyy v Russia, Application No 29580/12 and four others, GC Judgment of 15 November 2018, paras 19, 
107-8, 134-137. 
8 Annenkov and Others v Russia, Application 31475/10, Judgment of 25 July 2017, para 123. 
9 Nosov and Others v Russia, Application Nos 9117/04 and 10441/04, Judgment of 20 February 2014, paras 13 
and 49. 
10 M Nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd edn, Kehl: N.P Engel 2005) 
484, para 5. 
11 Eg Korol v Belarus, Views adopted 14 July 2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/117/D/2089/2011, para 7.5. 
12 The Committee announced that General Comment No 37 would focus on the right of peaceful assembly at the 
close of its 124th session (‘Human Rights Committee closes one hundred and twenty-fourth session in Geneva’, 
2 November 2018).  
13 See further, M O’Flaherty, ‘Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 34’ (2012) 12(4) Human Rights Law 
Review 627, 646; Anja Seibert-Fohr, ‘The UN Human Rights Committee’ in Gerd Oberleitner (ed), 
International Human Rights Institutions, Tribunals, and Courts (Springer 2018).  
14 Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Clarendon Press 1994) para 11.25. 
15 Communication No 1790/2008, Govsha, Syritsa and Mezyak v Belarus, Views adopted 27 July 2012, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/105/D/1790/2008, para 9.4. 
16 The drafting of a General Comment has long for been advocated – eg I Jaques, ‘Peaceful protest: a 
cornerstone of democracy: How to address the challenges?’ (Wilton Park Conference WP1154, 26-28 January 
2012) p 2, para 5: ‘There is broad agreement that the Committee should now do so as a priority.’. 
17 Recognizing that Concluding Observations are themselves merely recommendatory – see, H Keller and L 
Grover, ‘General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and their Legitimacy’ in Helen Keller and Geir 
Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treat Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (CUP 2012) 116 at 166. 
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impact on the exercise of the right for years to come.18 Of particular relevance in this regard is 
the digital mediation of assemblies in online and virtual spaces.19 
Drawing on the Committee’s jurisprudence and Concluding Observations,20 this article 
argues that an inclusive approach to determining the meaning and scope of ‘assembly’ is 
needed to effectively protect individuals who seek to gather with others (Section II). It explores 
the interrelationship of ‘assembly’ with ‘expression’ and ‘association’ with a view to 
identifying its autonomous sphere (Section III). Section IV then focuses on the constitutive 
elements of definitions of ‘assembly’ advanced by Manfred Nowak, by the UN Human Rights 
Committee in the course of drafting General Comment No 37, and by the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Freedom of Assembly and of Association (UNSR FoAA) and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). On the basis of the elements identified – numerosity, 
participation, intention, purpose and place – the article proposes a definition of ‘assembly’ as 
‘an intentional gathering by two or more people (including in private and online/virtual 
spaces)’. This definition seeks to distinguish ‘assembly’ from purely happenstance gatherings 
(in the interests of descriptive plausibility) and jettisons the strictures of ‘temporary’, ‘common 
expressive purpose’ and ‘publicly accessible place’ which – if introduced prematurely at the 
level of definition – undermine the values that animate an effective right of peaceful assembly. 
 
 
II. TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE DEFINITION 
 
Elaborating the parameters and ‘ordinary meaning’21 of the term ‘assembly’ is necessary to 
determine whether Article 21 is engaged on a given set of facts and whether an assembly-based 
claim is admissible ratione materiae. However, the interpretation of ‘assembly’ risks being 
unduly conditioned by three factors in particular – deference to States through the doctrine of 
subsidiarity, regulatory definitions of ‘assembly’ in domestic law and the positive obligations 
of State actors. These factors are addressed briefly in turn to underscore the importance of an 
inclusive definition. 
The subsidiary status of supra-national human rights bodies means that they will not 
prescribe how specifically States ought to protect the right of peaceful assembly. However, 
while subsidiarity may be relevant to determining the level of deference appropriately afforded 
to States when scrutinizing restrictions, such considerations should not bite at the more 
fundamental stage of articulating the meaning and scope of the right. This was emphasized by 
the Human Rights Committee in General Comment 34, recalling ‘that the scope of this freedom 
is not to be assessed by reference to a “margin of appreciation”’22 In more abstract terms, as 
Judith Butler has noted, freedom of assembly ‘has to precede and exceed any form of 
 
18 The potential lifespan of a General Comment is significant. For example, General Comment 34 (12 
September 2011) on Freedom of Opinion and Expression replaced General Comment 10 (1983); General 
Comment 36 (3 September 2019) on the right to life replaced General Comments 6 (1982) and 14 (1984). 
19 Text to n 227 – n 246 below. Also, M Hamilton et al, ‘The Right of Peaceful Assembly in Online Spaces: A 
Comment on the Revised Draft General Comment No 37 on Article 21’ (Submission to the UN Human Rights 
Committee February 2020). 
20 See the preliminary study, submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee in advance of its half-day 
discussion on General Comment No 37 on 20 March 2019: M Hamilton, ‘Towards General Comment No 37 on 
Article 21 ICCPR: The Right of Peaceful Assembly’ (ECNL, ICNL & UEA 2019). Also, M Hamilton, 
‘Comments on Draft General Comment 37 on Article 21 ICCPR: The Right of Peaceful Assembly’ (21 
February 2020). 
21 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 
UNTS 331 (VCLT) Art 31. 
22 HRC, ‘General Comment 34: Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression’, para 36. 
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government that confers that right of assembly’.23 It would fatally undermine the right of 
peaceful assembly if its scope was left to be determined by individual States. 
Definitions of ‘assembly’ generally pursue one of two purposes – they are either protective 
(as in various human rights treaties) or regulatory (as in domestic laws governing different 
forms of gathering). This distinction, however, is often exploited24 or obscured25 and the 
protective scope of the right should not be predicated upon regulatory definitions in domestic 
law. Defining the scope of the right is an entirely different undertaking from defining either (a) 
the types of assembly that might legitimately be regulated (different forms of protected 
assembly may be regulated differently, and some properly not regulated at all)26 or (b) the types 
of assembly that might be exempted from domestic regulation (exempted assemblies might still 
need protection against unwarranted interference from State actors, counter-demonstrators or 
other third parties).  
In a similar vein, the types of assembly protected by Article 21 should not be 
overdetermined by the positive obligations that we think States ought to bear. Different forms 
of assembly give rise to different obligations, both negative and positive – State obligations are 
not ‘one-size-fits-all’. As such, the scope of Article 21 should not be coextensive with only 
those assemblies that entail State intervention, even if the discharge of positive obligations is 
a reliable indicator of the assemblies most acutely in need of protection. Such reverse-
engineering risks distorting the protective scope of the right by excluding those assemblies that 
ought to be protected simply by being left alone. 
 
 
III.  ‘ASSEMBLY’ AS AN AUTONOMOUS RIGHT 
 
The right of peaceful assembly is often cast in instrumental terms – serving either expressive 
or associational ends, or both. Such reasoning, however, relegates ‘assembly’ to second-tier 
status, denying its independent value and evading enquiry into its autonomous sphere. 
Undoubtedly, assembly, expression and association overlap – eg associations commonly 
organize assemblies27 and transient assemblies can catalyse the establishment of more formal 
associations.28 But there is a need to delineate the boundaries between these rights to reliably 
and consistently determine when each is engaged (together or alone). 
Before exploring the contiguity of ‘assembly’ with ‘protest’, ‘expression’ and ‘association’ 
(respectively, parts A, B and C below), it is useful first to consider the lex specialis derogat 
lege generali maxim (‘a special rule departs from the general rule’). This maxim is commonly 
invoked by the European Court of Human Rights – and has occasionally been argued before 
the Human Rights Committee29 – where the rights of expression and assembly are potentially 
engaged together.30 The Strasbourg Court has emphasized that ‘notwithstanding its 
 
23  J Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly (Harvard University Press 2015) 160; M Hardt 
and A Negri Assembly (OUP 2017) 295; Text to n 120 below. 
24 Tatár and Fáber v Hungary, Application Nos 26005/08 and 26160/08, Judgment of 12 June 2012, para 29. 
25 Kivenmaa v Finland, Views adopted 31 March 1994, UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/412/1990. Ms Kivenmaa sought 
to deny that ‘what took place was a public meeting’ under domestic law while claiming that it was an ‘assembly’ 
protected under Article 21. Having confirmed the latter, the Committee confusingly stated (para 9.2) that such an 
event was not a ‘demonstration’. See, the Individual opinion by Mr Kurt Herndl (dissenting), para 2.5; Nowak (n 
10) 486, para 7. 
26 Tatár and Fáber v Hungary (n 24) paras 38-39. 
27 Eg Trofimchuk v Ukraine, Application No 4241/03, Judgment of 28 October 2010, para 39). Also, Nowak (n 
10) 485. 
28 Eg Romanovsky v Belarus, Views adopted 29 October 2015, UN Doc CCPR/C/115/D/2011/2010, para 2.1. 
29 Kivenmaa (n 25) para 7.4; Govsha, Syritsa and Mezyak v Belarus (n 15) para 3.4(a). 
30 European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 11 (n 3), para 8. 
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autonomous role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 must also be considered in the 
light of Article 10, where the aim of the exercise of freedom of assembly is the expression of 
personal opinions.’31 As this suggests, Article 10 might most commonly be regarded as lex 
generalis in relation to Article 11 as lex specialis32 (though the Court does not always adopt 
this formulation).33 The converse, however, is equally plausible and the Court has on several 
occasions found a violation of ‘Article 10 read in the light of Article 11’ (though it has never 
expressly designated Article 11 as lex generalis and Article 10 as lex specialis).34  
While the lex specialis principle is often applied in respect of concurrent and overlapping 
rules to avoid duplication (where no direct conflict arises),35 as Silvia Sorzetto rightly notes, it 
is not that the lex specialis principle then determines which provision (here, expression or 
assembly) applies. Rather, ‘the application of the principle depends on the previous 
identification of distinct rules’36 – ie on a clear understanding of the material scope of the right 
of assembly. Thus, resorting to the lex specialis maxim properly recognizes the fact-sensitive 
and fluid inter-connection between assembly, expression and association (and is premised on 
the impossibility in many cases of achieving clear separation). However, far from resolving the 
parameters of Article 21, it underscores the importance of doing so. 
 
A. Distinguishing ‘Assembly’ from ‘Protest’ and ‘Demonstration’ 
 
The terms ‘protest’ and ‘demonstration’ do not feature in the text of international human rights 
treaties.37 As such, they highlight the overlapping nature of the rights of expression and 
assembly, but obscure rather than illuminate the distinctive value of each. The term ‘protest’ 
suggests a declarative element (with oppositional or transgressive connotations) absent from 
the more anodyne term ‘assembly’.38 Arguably, ‘demonstration’ lies somewhere between 
‘assembly’ and ‘protest’. Its ordinary usage places it closer to ‘protest’ since to demonstrate 
something necessarily entails a communicative element that (as argued in ‘B’ below) may be 
absent from an assembly.39 One might also demonstrate something without doing so in 
protest.40  
While assemblies can be a form of protest,41 many assemblies are not (an assembly may, 
for example, be celebratory, ceremonial or commemorative). Conversely, many protests do not 
 
31 Kudrevičius and Others v Lithuania, Application No 37553/05, GC Judgment of 15 October 2015, para 86 
(emphasis added).  
32 Eg Ezelin v France, Application No 11800/85, Judgment of 26 April 1991, para 35.  
33 Eg Berladir and Others v Russia, Application 34202/06, Judgment of 10 July 2012, para 36. 
34 Eg Women on Waves and Others v Portugal, Application No 31276/05, Judgment of 3 February 2009, para 
28; Karademirci and Others v  Turkey, Application Nos 37096/97 and 37101/97, Judgment of 25 January 2005, 
para 26; Fáber v Hungary, Application No 40721/08, Judgment of 24 July 2012, paras 19 and 59; Butkevich v 
Russia, Application No 5865/07, Judgment of 13 February 2018, para 122. 
35 Silvia Zorzetto, ‘The Lex Specialis Principle and its Uses in Legal Argumentation: An Analytical Inquiry’ 3 
Eunomia. Revisita en Cultura de la Legalidad (September 2012-February 2013) 63. 
36 ibid 66. 
37 Nonetheless, a key report from the Inter-American system is framed in the language of ‘protest’, defining this 
as ‘a form of individual or collective action aimed at expressing ideas, views, or values of dissent, opposition, 
denunciation, or vindication’ and noting that social protest is ‘protected by a constellation of rights and 
freedoms’: Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR), Protest and Human Rights: Standards on the rights involved in social protest and the 
obligations to guide the response of the State (2019), ‘Foreword’ and paras 1-16. 
38 D Mead, The New Law of Peaceful Protest (Hart 2010) 183, n 84. 
39 D Kretzmer, ‘Demonstrations and the Law’ (1984) 19 Israel Law Review 47, 50-1. 
40 Mead (n 38) 59 and 152-3. 
41 See eg Navalnyy v Russia, Application No 29580/12 and four others, GC Judgment of 15 November 2018, 
para 107; Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR (n 37), para 19: ‘Freedom 
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take the form of an assembly (consider, for example, boycotts, petitions or acts of self-
immolation). While ‘pickets’ as a form of strike action are a type of assembly (and deserve 
protection as such), industrial action and strikes involving the withholding of labour need not 
involve assemblies. The Human Rights Committee has considered cases involving the 
submission of letters of protest under Article 1942 and suggested that hunger strikes could 
potentially engage Article 19.43 Indeed, Michael O’Flaherty notes that the first draft of General 
Comment 34 expressly sought to include within the scope of Article 19 the ‘choice of clothing 
or the wearing or carrying of a religious or other symbol, and a hunger strike’.44 More 
extensively, Strasbourg Article 10 jurisprudence is littered with protest actions, considered by 
the Court through the lens of freedom of expression.45 
 
B. Distinguishing ‘Assembly’ from ‘Expression’ 
 
While distinguishing ‘protest’ from ‘assembly’ might be relatively straightforward, it is much 
more difficult to disentangle ‘assembly’ from ‘expression’. The Human Rights Committee has 
emphasized the interdependence of expression and assembly46 and has found concurrent 
violations of the right to freedom of expression (Article 19) and the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly (Article 21) in more than 30 cases.47 Assemblies are frequently expressive and an 
assembly might even surpass ‘mere speech’ on its own terms, providing a potent 
communicative tool that serves to demonstrate intensity of support.48 However, while the 
Committee has occasionally explained why Article 19 is additionally engaged on the facts of a 
particular case,49 there remains a need to explain both the inter-relationship between Articles 
19 and 21 and the distinctive ambit of the latter.50 
The seemingly umbilical attachment of ‘assembly’ to ‘speech’51 was raised in the 
dissenting opinion of Committee member, Mr Herndl, in Kivenmaa v Finland (1994)52 properly 
recognizing ‘the intimate and somewhat complex relationship between Articles 19 and 21.’ 
However, the dissenting opinion then cites John Humphrey (the Canadian jurist responsible for 
drafting the initial text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) to argue that: ‘[t]he right 
 
of assembly protects the peaceful, intentional, and temporary congregation of people in a given space for the 
achievement of a common goal, including protest.’ 
42 Kerrouche v Algeria, Views adopted 3 November 2016, UN Doc CCPR/C/118/D/2128/2012. 
43 Baban v Australia, Views adopted 6 August 2003, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001, para 6.7. 
44 O’Flaherty, (n 13) 648.  
45 Eg Karácsony and others v Hungary, Application Nos 42461/13 and 44357/13, GC Judgment of 17 May 
2016, para 120; Açık and Others v Turkey, Application No 31451/03, Judgment of 13 January 2009, para 40; 
Murat Vural v Turkey, Application No 9540/07, Judgment of 21 October 2014, paras 44-56; Sinkova v Ukraine, 
Application No 39496/11, Judgment of 27 February 2018, para 100; Steel and Others v the United Kingdom, 
Application No 24838/94, Judgment of 23 September 1998, para 92. 
46 Eg Praded v Belarus, Views adopted 10 October 2014, UN Doc CCPR/C/112/D/2029/2011, paras 4, 7.3-7.4. 
47 Eg Kim v Uzbekistan, Views adopted 4 April 2018, UN Doc CCPR/C/122/D/2175/2012, paras 13.7-13.8 and 
in Belyazeka v Belarus, Views adopted 23 March 2012, UN Doc CCPR/C/104/D/1772/2008, paras 11.6 and 
11.8. 
48 Eg Tatár and Fáber (n 24) para 38. 
49 Eg Govsha, Syritsa and Mezyak (n 15) para 9.4.  
50 In four cases where complaints under both Articles were deemed admissible, the Committee decided not to 
examine separately the author’s claim under Art 21: Katsora v Belarus, Views adopted 24 October 2012, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/106/D/1836/2008, paras 6.4 and 7.6; Protsko and Tolchin v Belarus, Views adopted 1 November 
2013, UN Doc CCPR/C/109/D/1919-1920/2009, paras 6.6 and 7.9; Pivonos v Belarus, Views adopted 29 
October 2012, UN Doc CCPR/C/106/D/1830/2008, paras 8.4 and 9.4; Komarovsky v Belarus, Views adopted 25 
October 2013, UN Doc CCPR/C/109/D/1839/2008, paras 8.4 and 9.5. 
51 The word ‘speech’ is used here interchangeably with ‘expression’ (but that is not to suggest that expression 
necessarily involves ‘pure’ speech). Similarly, text to n 59. 
52 Kivenmaa (n 25). 
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of peaceful assembly would seem to be just one facet of the more general right to freedom of 
expression.’53 In a similar vein, despite emphasizing the particular democratic functions of 
assemblies, Manfred Nowak has suggested that for the right of assembly to be engaged, 
information or ideas should be ‘directed at the public’ and so the right of assembly is to be 
‘understood as a special, institutional form of freedom of expression conditioned by its specific, 
democratic meaning’.54  
Yet we ought to be able to explain what is unique about assembly without falling back on 
its purported expressiveness. It might be thought that assembly could be distinguished from 
expression by emphasizing either (a) the collective nature of assemblies, (b) the presence or 
visibility of participants, or (c) the difference between speech and action/conduct. However, as 
the following discussion illustrates, none of these tests yields a reliable principle of distinction 
(and they highlight instead further points of convergence between the two rights). 
The Strasbourg Court has sought to distinguish assembly from speech on the basis that 
participants are not merely expressing an opinion but doing so together with others.55 The 
presence of a multitude is certainly a necessary condition for an assembly (see further the 
discussion of single-person protests in section IV(A) below) – and crowd size is undoubtedly 
often important to those who are assembled.56 As Tilly has argued, disciplined assemblies are 
a form of ‘WUNC’ display – aimed at signalling collective Worthiness, Unity, Numbers and 
Commitment.57 A focus on numbers, however, serves only to underscore the interconnection 
between speech and assembly, casting the latter as a form of ‘speech plus’ rather than 
illuminating its autonomous sphere. 
An emphasis on the physical presence of assemblies also fails to sufficiently distinguish 
assembly from speech. For one, assemblies may take place in private spaces (section IV(D) 
below). Moreover, speech routinely occurs in public58 and speakers may also speak merely by 
virtue of their presence.59 While it is suggested here that an assembled presence does not 
invariably entail speech,60 as Salát notes, even in relation to meetings that do not primarily aim 
at expression, State intervention will generally ‘relate at least to potential expression of group 
identity through shared activity.’61 
Efforts to distinguish speech from action have faltered similarly. Thomas Emerson, in his 
attempt to elucidate a ‘comprehensive and effective theory’ of the First Amendment, 
distinguished between ‘expression’ (deserving of full protection) and ‘action’ or ‘conduct’ (that 
may legitimately be abridged).62 However, despite its apparent resonance with the boundary 
between ‘expression’ and ‘assembly’, Emerson’s expression-action dichotomy had an entirely 
different aim63 – namely, to fully protect non-coercive (or peaceful) expression (which, on this 
account, includes nonverbal assembly) while allowing for the regulation of coercive (or non-
peaceful) conduct.64 Indeed, Emerson’s sweeping classification of ‘action’ includes many 
forms of assembly that are offered some level of protection in international human rights law. 
 
53 ibid, Individual opinion by Mr. Kurt Herndl (dissenting), paras 3.3-3.4. 
54 Nowak (n 10) 485. 
55 Primov and Others v Russia, Application No 17391/06, Judgment of 12 June 2014, para 91. 
56 L Robertson and R Farley, ‘The Facts on Crowd Size’ (Factcheck, 23 January 2017). 
57 C Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (CUP 2003) 197; CE Baker, ‘Scope of the First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech’ (1978) 25 UCLA L Rev 1011, fn 129. 
58 Tatár and Fáber (n 24) para 38. 
59 Aleksandrov v Belarus, Views adopted 24 July 2014, UN Doc CCPR/C/111/D/1933/2010, para 2.4.  
60 cf JD Inazu, Liberty’s Refuge (Yale University Press 2012) 50; Butler (n 23) 156. 
61 O Salát, The Right to Freedom of Assembly: A Comparative Study (Hart 2015) 7. 
62 TI Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (Random House, New York 1970) 16-17. 
63 Emerson himself critiques the US Supreme Court’s ‘confusing and destructive’ distinction between ‘pure 
speech’ and ‘conduct’ invoked in numerous assembly cases, ibid, 294-8. 
64 Emerson (n 62) 293. See further, Baker (n 57) 1040. 
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On his view, ‘action’  included sit-ins, lie-ins, and chain-ins ‘in which the physical occupation 
of territory is used as a form of pressure’, ‘the obstruction of traffic, or obstruction of ingress 
or egress, when undertaken for the purpose of physical interference’, ‘[d]isruption of a meeting 
by moving about or making noise’ and the ‘wearing of masks or uniforms under circumstances 
implying the use of force or violence’.65 So notwithstanding the initial appeal of Emerson’s 
theory, we must look elsewhere to delineate the boundary between assembly and expression.  
It has been argued that numerosity, presence and action each fail to yield a defensible 
distinction between speech and assembly. Instead, the point of departure involves gatherings 
that neither entail any locutionary act nor have any perlocutionary effect,66 or at least, where 
any expressive component is entirely incidental to the gathering itself. In this regard, the right 
of peaceful assembly protects a range of relational interests quite apart from those deriving 
from speech. This is not a novel position: writing more than forty years ago, C. Edwin Baker 
articulated the same argument: 
 
‘… the constitutional language that specifies “the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble” hardly suggests that their central purpose of the assembly must be 
speech. It certainly does not suggest that their purpose must be to disseminate or 
debate ideas. People combine, assemble to do things; they assemble for a wide 
variety of purposes: for celebrations, for entertainment, for work, for generating or 
expressing power. … One cannot reasonably narrow the constitutional protection 
of assemblies to protection merely of an adjunct to speech or some marketplace of 
ideas.’67 
 
More recently, Inazu has argued that ‘something is lost when assembly is dichotomously 
construed as either a moment of expression (when it is viewed as speech) or an expressionless 
group (when it is viewed as association).’68 Similarly, Bhagwat has critiqued ‘the pernicious 
idea that groups deserve protection only to the extent that they are expressive.’69 The key 
insight is that the communicative function of an assembly (if indeed there is one) may be 
secondary to its social and relational value – and it is here that the autonomous sphere of 
assembly begins to come into view. Just as it does so, however, the very same underlying value 
attests to the interconnection between assembly and association. 
 
C. Distinguishing ‘Assembly’ from ‘Association’ 
 
At a conceptual level, as with expression, there is an evanescent boundary between the rights 
of assembly and of association, depending in part on organizational form and structure (or lack 
thereof).70 While associations can be expressive,71 as Tabatha Abu El-Haj notes, the essential 
characteristic of an association meriting protection is less its message than ‘the nature of the 
 
65 Emerson, ibid, 293-4. 
66 J L Austin, How to Do Things with Words. The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 
1955 (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1975) 94-5 and 101-3. 
67 Baker (n 57) 1030-1. 
68 JD Inazu, ‘The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly’ (2010) 84 Tulane Law Review 567. 
69 A Bhagwat, ‘Assembly Resurrected’ (2012) 91 Texas Law Review 364; A Bhagwat, ‘Liberty’s Refuge, or the 
Refuge of Scoundrels?: The Limits of the Right of Assembly’ (2012) 89 Wash U L Rev 1383–84. 
70 The two rights are combined in Art 11 ECHR but are treated separately in Arts 21 and 22 ICCPR; Arts 15 and 
16 ACHR; Arts 10 and 11 ACHPR. Note too, the combined mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur, UNHRC 
‘The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association’, 6 October 2010, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/21. 
71 Eg Kungurov v Uzbekistan, Views adopted 20 July 2011, UN Doc CCPR/C/102/D/1478/2006 para 8.9.  
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relationships within it and the ways in which they are organized.’72 Associations protect the 
antecedent relations and structures that make political participation possible – valuing 
‘participation as conduct, not just as voice’,73 and associations as ‘incubators of relationships’ 
not just ‘incubators of ideas’.74 What separates assembly from expression may in turn be 
precisely what links assembly with association. 
The right of association in international human rights law has generally centred on the 
right to form a voluntary association75  – ‘establishing a legal entity in order to act collectively 
in a field of mutual interest’76 such as Trade Unions,77 political parties or associations formed 
for other purposes.78 The association jurisprudence focuses on barriers to such activity – 
onerous conditions of registration, refusals to register an association (and related 
consequences),79 and transparency requirements pertaining to funding and expenditure.80 One 
might be tempted to think of association as the passive, and assembly as the active, component 
of group activity – but this overstates the link between the two since many assemblies have no 
formal associational impetus or effect.  
The rights of assembly and association together underpin the interactions crucial to 
stimulating and affirming nascent group identities. 81 Both rights are essential to civil society, 
enabling individuals to integrate and pursue common objectives,82 potentially also facilitating 
pre-figurative practices that envision new forms of political morality.83 Like assembly, the right 
of association has been recognized as a prerequisite for dissenting groups,84 and associations 
are, as Judith Butler has said of assembly, ‘a precondition of politics itself’.85 
However, having sought to cut the cord between assembly and speech, the risk is that we 
instead tether assembly to association. Making the conjoined case most starkly, C Edwin Baker 
has argued that ‘[i]n essence, an association is merely an assembly dispersed over time and 
space’, adding that: 
 
‘The key aspect of both is that they are combinations, not mere aggregations, of 
people; and as combinations, they are a source of power. Both form relations 
between people that enable the group to do things – often to do things beyond 
merely reasoning together. People come together in assemblies or associations in 
order to pursue or fulfil their goals.’86 
 
72 TA El-Haj, ‘Friends, Associates, and Associations: Theoretically and Empirically Grounding the Freedom of 
Association’ (2014) 56 Arizona Law Review 99. 
73 ibid, 62. 
74 ibid, 73.  
75 Young, James and Webster v the UK, Application Nos 7601/76 and 7806/77, Commission Report of 14 
December 1979, para 167. 
76 Gorzelik and Others v Poland, Application No 44158/98, GC Judgment of 17 February 2004, para 88. 
77 Notwithstanding the express reference in Art 21 ICCPR and Art 11 ECHR only to forming Trade Unions, the 
right has wider reach: Sidiropoulos and Others v Greece, Application No 26695/95, Judgment of 10 July 1998, 
para 40. 
78 Gorzelik (n 76) para 92. 
79 Eg Romanovsky (n 28).   
80 Eg Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi v Turkey, Application No 19920/13, Judgment of 26 April 2016. 
81 Inazu, (n 60) 5, 152; TA El-Haj, ‘All Assemble – Order and Disorder in Law, Politics, and Culture’ (2014) 16 
U Pa J Const L 954; G Kateb, ‘The Value of Association’ in Amy Gutmann (ed) Freedom of Association 
(Princeton University Press 1998) 37 and 49. 
82 Eg Gorzelik (n 76) para 92. 
83 G Hayes, ‘Regimes of austerity’ (2017) 16(1) Social Movement Studies 21; JW Müller, ‘What Spaces Does 
Democracy Need?’ (2019) 102(2-3) Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal 208. 
84 Eg Romanovsky (n 28) para 7.2; Inazu (n 60) 153. 
85 Butler (n 23) 160. That said, Butler appears to overlook Article 21 ICCPR (157-8 and 227, n 1); Similarly, 
Hardt and Negri (n 23) 293-4. 




Baker (like other US scholars) was writing in the specific context of a constitutional framework 
containing no textual guarantee of the right of association.87 When viewed from this perspective 
(given the precarious protection for group activity), Baker’s emphasis on the interconnection 
between assembly and association is unsurprising – it underpins his broader argument that the 
right of assembly in the First Amendment provides ‘the logical basis of the right of association’. 
However, it clearly draws us further still from identifying the autonomous sphere of assembly.  
In considering Baker’s reference to the extended temporal span of associations (‘dispersed 
over time’) versus the generally short-term nature of assemblies, it is worth considering 
whether assembly could plausibly be distinguished from association by defining assembly as 
‘temporary’.88 However, the notion of temporariness is inherently imprecise. More insidiously, 
the reference to ‘temporary’ has provided governments with the pretext for premature 
intervention, raising questions of whether protracted sit-ins or semi-permanent encampments 
actually fall within the protective scope of Article 21.89 Long-term assemblies ought to be 
afforded protection in principle – the relative permanence of a protest camp has, for example, 
been argued to be a ‘constant reminder to those in power’.90 Given too that associations can be 
short-lived and assemblies can last for years,91 it is suggested that ‘temporariness’ should not 
be regarded as a distinctive (still less, definitive) characteristic of ‘assembly’.92 Despite the fact 
that assemblies may often be temporary and associations more long-term, measures of duration 
fail to reliably separate assembly from association.  
Alternatively, we might conceive of the right of peaceful ‘assembly’ as relating to the 
holding of spatially bounded events and ‘association’ as pertaining more generally to the 
organizational activities of groups.93 This flags a further parallel between the two rights: the 
organization of assemblies often involves decisions to include or exclude particular 
participants, similar to the decisions that characterize the right of association.94 In this regard, 
the Human Rights Committee has stated that ‘[t]he organizers of an assembly generally have 
the right to choose whom they wish to invite to participate …’,95 an assertion that broadly 
echoes the US Supreme Court judgment in Hurley and South Boston Allied War Veterans 
Council v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.96 However, the court 
 
87 Brennan J in Roberts v United States Jaycees 468 US 609, 618 (1984) distinguishing ‘intimate association’ 
from ‘expressive association’ – a bifurcation widely criticized for failing to protect associations that are neither 
‘intimate’ nor ‘expressive’. See, Inazu, ‘Virtual Assembly’ (2013) 98 Cornell Law Review 1116-18; El-Haj (n 
72) 69. 
88 Salát (n 61) 4 relies on such a distinction. So too does Nowak (n 10) 484. 
89 The ACHPR, Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa (2017) paras 3 and 88 expressly 
resist any such limitation: ‘Assembly refers to an act of intentionally gathering … for an extended duration’. 
90 R (on the application of Gallastegui) v Westminster City Council and Others [2013] EWCA Civ 28, para 13. 
Also, WJT Mitchell, ‘Image, Space, Revolution: The Arts of Occupation’, 39(1) Critical Inquiry (Autumn 2012) 
14 describing the occupations of Tahrir Square and Zuccotti Park as ‘manifestations of a long-term resolve.’ 
91 Consider, for example, the Womens’ Peace Camp at Greenham Common in England which lasted for 19 
years (from 1981 to 2000); Cissé v France, Application No 51346/99, Judgment of 9 April 2002; 
Razvozzhayev v Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v Russia, Application Nos 75734/12, 2695/15 and 55325/15, 
19 November 2019, paras 285 and 292.  
92 See text to n 115 – n 116 below. 
93 Focusing exclusively on what occurs during an event might unduly circumscribe the scope of Article 21 – but 
not everything protected by Article 21 is an assembly but rather attracts protection because of its importance to 
assembling. Similarly, Inazu, (n 87) 1122. 
94 Inazu (n 87) 1098-99. 
95 Giménez v Paraguay, Views adopted 25 July 2018, UN Doc CCPR/C/123/D/2372/2014, para 8.3. 
96 515 US 557 (1995). More recently, see eg R Salerno, ‘Has Pride sold out by inviting Toronto police back to 
the parade?’ (NowToronto, 29 November 2018); P Greenfield, ‘Pride organisers say sorry after anti-trans group 
leads march’ (The Guardian, 8 July 2018). Civic events, perhaps in receipt of public funding, suggest that the 
blunt presumption of exclusive control established in Hurley deserves much more nuanced analysis. For critical 
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in Hurley overlooked a critical dimension of what it means to be excluded from an ‘assembly’97 
– one which also helps more clearly draw a line between assembly and association – namely, 
the profound role of space and place in the construction of identity.98 
Just as places ‘are laden with meanings that tend to create and reinforce relations of 
domination and subordination’,99 so too their regulation serves to spatially reproduce relations 
of power. As Timothy Zick has noted, ‘[w]hen connections to place are severed or restricted, 
people may experience the condition or state of “placelessness”.’100 The fundamentally spatial 
nature of assemblies renders them at once a tool of entrenchment and resistance – capable of 
both inscribing territorial boundaries that reify given social relations101 and mobilizing 
transgressive demands that challenge exclusive claims of possession, access and use.102  
To summarize the argument thus far, the right of assembly protects relational bonds quite 
apart from any communicative purpose that an assembly may (or may not) have, and the 
inherently spatial nature of gatherings helps sharpen the line between assembly and association. 
This argument evinces a degree of circularity, coming close to suggesting that the associational 
dimensions of ‘assembly’ are what distinguishes ‘assembly’ from ‘expression’, while the (often 
profoundly expressive) spatial boundedness of assemblies helps differentiate ‘assembly’ from 
‘association’. Recognizing, however, that the right of peaceful assembly will often be 
shadowed by the rights of expression and association does not preclude the definition of 
‘assembly’ for the purposes of delineating its protective scope. The remainder of this article 
therefore turns to explore how the convergence of these relational and spatial dimensions might 
best be reflected in a protective definition of ‘assembly’. 
 
 
IV. ELEMENTS OF A PROTECTIVE DEFINITION 
 
Manfred Nowak, in his seminal interpretation of the ICCPR, suggested that ‘only intentional, 
temporary gatherings of several persons for a specific purpose are afforded the protection of 
freedom of assembly.’103 This final section scrutinizes the elements highlighted – and those 
omitted – in this and other definitions of ‘assembly’.  
A number of scholarly definitions of ‘assembly’ place emphasis on the co-ordinated nature 
of assemblies, the temporally contemporaneous and synchronistic nature of gathering and the 
spatial proximity and density of participants. Orsolya Salát, for example, considers an assembly 
to be ‘the contemporaneous common presence of at least two persons in a common space’.104 
Judith Butler identifies a range of relevant factors that ‘constitute essential dimensions of 
assembly and demonstration’ – namely: ‘temporal seriality and coordination, bodily proximity, 
auditory range, coordinated vocalization’.105 And Paulo Gerbaudo argues that ‘[t]he act of 
 
discussion, see C Stychin, ‘Celebration and Consolidation: National Rituals and the Legal Construction of 
American Identities’ (1998) 18(2) OJLS 265; M Sunder, ‘Authorship and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The 
Intellectual Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston’ (1996) 49 Stanford Law Review 143. 
97 SA Marston, ‘Space, culture, state: uneven developments in political geography’ (2004) 23(1) Political 
Geography 9. 
98 M Goodwin, ‘Citizenship and Governance’, in P Cloke, P Crang, and M Goodwin (eds) Introducing Human 
Geographies (3rd edn, Routledge 2014) 569; Stychin (n 96) 266.  
99 T Cresswell, ‘Place’ in Cloke, Crang, and Goodwin, ibid, 250-1. 
100 T Zick, Speech Out of Doors: Preserving First Amendment Liberties in Public Places (CUP 2009) 10. 
101 Doreen Massey argues that the concept of ‘territoriality’ connotes an imagined and nostalgic sense of spatial 
fixity and rootedness, of space as naturally divided and bounded. D Massey, For Space (Sage 2005) 64-5. 
102 Goodwin (n 98) 572.  
103 Nowak (n 10) 484, para 5. 
104 Salát (n 61) 7. 
105 Butler (n 23) 178. 
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bodily assembling … revolves around the construction of a situation of bodily density 
dominated by face-to-face communication.’106  
Factors such as temporal synchronicity, spatial proximity or organizational co-ordination 
are not, however, expressly reflected in Nowak’s definition or the definitions of the 
international human rights actors working at the forefront of assembly protection – principally, 
the UN Human Rights Committee (in drafting General Comment No 37), the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (UNSR), the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE/ODIHR) and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR). Moreover, there is significant definitional divergence between even these 
leading definitions, as the following overview reveals.  
The UN Special Rapporteur has defined an ‘assembly’ as ‘an intentional and temporary 
gathering in a private or public space for a specific purpose’.107 The definition proposed by 
the OSCE/ODIHR is ‘the intentional gathering of a number of individuals in a publicly 
accessible place for a common expressive purpose.’108 The ACHPR describes assembly as 
referring to ‘an act of intentionally gathering, in private or in public, for an expressive purpose 
and for an extended duration.’109 Notably, the definition adopted by the UN Human Rights 
Committee in the course of drafting General Comment No 37 has undergone several revisions. 
The initial draft of the General Comment (June 2019) defined ‘assembly’ as a ‘gathering of a 
number of people in a publicly accessible place with a common expressive purpose’. Following 
the first reading by the Committee, a revised draft text published in November 2019 proposed 
an amended definition – namely, a ‘gathering of persons with a common expressive purpose in 
[a publicly accessible / the same] place’.110 Then, at the outset of the second reading of the 
General Comment during the Committee’s 128th Session (having considered a wide range of 
stakeholder submissions), the Committee’s Rapporteur proposed that assembly be defined as 
an ‘intentional gathering by persons, principally with an expressive purpose.’111 Following 
some further deliberation,112 the Committee revised the text again so as to define an ‘assembly’ 
as a ‘gathering by persons for a specific purpose, primarily with an expressive goal.’113 Article 
21 was also stated to protect peaceful assemblies ‘wherever they may take place: outdoors, 
indoors and online, and in public and private spaces, or in a combination of these.’114 
Notably, contra Nowak and the UN Special Rapporteur, neither the OSCE/ODIHR nor 
ACHPR describe an assembly as ‘temporary’ (though previous editions of the OSCE/ODIHR 
– Venice Commission Guidelines did do so).115 While the revised draft of General Comment 
37 does not define an assembly as temporary per se, later paragraphs hint that temporariness 
might properly be considered as an intrinsic definitional element.116 Building upon the 
 
106 P Gerbaudo, Tweets and the Streets: Social Media and Contemporary Activism (Pluto 2012) 39. 
107 UNSR FoAA, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association, Maina Kiai’ (21 May 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/20/27, para 24. 
108 Draft OSCE/ODIHR – Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (3rd edition, 
forthcoming). 
109 ACHPR (n 89) para 3. 
110 Revised draft of General Comment No 37 (November 2019). The text in parenthesis ‘[  ]’ indicates language 
on which consensus was not reached during the first reading.  
111 UN Web TV, ‘Second reading of draft General Comment 37, 3707th Meeting, 128th Session of Human 
Rights Committee 13 March 2020’, discussion of para 4, at 1.14:00-1.16:40. 
112 ibid at 1:06:40-1:39:10. 
113 ibid at 1:38:55.  
114 ibid, regarding para 6 of the draft General Comment (discussion from 1:53:45 and adopted text at 2:16:40). 
115 Note text to n 88 – n 92 above, emphasizing the redundancy and risk of any such qualification. 
116 Despite the absence of any reference to ‘temporariness’ in paras 4 or 13 of the revised draft General 
Comment (November 2019), para 62 of the draft (in the section on ‘Restrictions’) provides that: ‘[p]eaceful 
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relational and spatial characteristics of assembly discussed in Section III, five definitional 
elements – (A) numerosity; (B) participation; (C) intentionality; (D) purpose and (E) space and 
place – deserve further consideration, and this final section explores each in turn. A preliminary 
note of caution, however. Recalling the vital distinction between regulatory and protective 
definitions (see Section II above), it is imperative that the protective definitions discussed here 
are not interpreted by States as justifying regulation. Furthermore, in General Comment 34 on 
the right to freedom of expression, the Human Rights Committee opted not to expressly include 
particular forms of expression in the text ‘on the understanding that the list of forms of 
expression must always be an open one’.117 In a similar vein, while the European Court of 
Human Rights has, for example, emphasized that both stationary and moving assemblies are 
protected,118 the Court has also sought ‘[t]o avert the risk of a restrictive interpretation’ by 
refraining ‘from formulating the notion of an assembly, which it regards as an autonomous 
concept, or exhaustively listing the criteria which would define it …’119 The perils of definition 
– principally, inflexibility and the potential for arbitrary exclusion – are worth keeping in mind.  
 
A. Numerosity and Single-person Protests 
 
Article 21 does not follow the conventional formulation (found in both Articles 19(2) and 22 
ICCPR, and indeed, the assembly right under Article 20 UDHR) that ‘[e]veryone shall have 
the right to freedom of [X]’. Instead, Article 21 asserts that ‘[t]he right of peaceful assembly 
shall be recognized’ – wording that appears originally to have been proposed on natural law 
grounds (on the basis that the role of States parties was merely to recognize rather than confer 
this inalienable right).120 Nowak notes that René Cassin, the French delegate to the Human 
Rights Commission, further argued that the phrasing ‘Everyone shall have the right …’ could 
not be used because more than one person is needed for an assembly.121 As draft General 
Comment No 37 properly emphasizes, however, ‘the right of peaceful assembly constitutes an 
individual right that is exercised collectively.’ 122  
In order for a gathering to be recognized and thus protected as an assembly, we might ask 
whether a straightforward numerical threshold (such as ‘more than one’ or ‘two or more’ 
individuals) would suffice to determine whether the right of peaceful assembly is engaged. The 
definitions of both the ACHPR and the UN Special Rapporteur omit any reference to ‘persons’ 
(Human Rights Committee), ‘several persons’ (Nowak) or ‘number of individuals’ 
(OSCE/ODIHR) – perhaps on the basis that this is tautologous, already captured by the word 
‘gathering’ – but such additional emphasis might helpfully underscore the distinction between 
‘assembly’ and single-person protests. 
In this regard, State authorities have sometimes argued that a lone protester, or even the 
conjoined actions of a small number of protesters, necessarily constitute a notifiable assembly 
(thereby rendering them potentially liable for failure to follow the requisite procedure).123 
 
assemblies are generally by their nature temporary’ and para 68 similarly limits the erection of structures at 
assemblies to ‘non-permanent constructions’ on account of ‘the temporary nature of assemblies.’ 
117 O’Flaherty (n 13) 648. 
118 Eg Christians Against Racism and Fascism (CARAF) v UK (1980), Application No 8440/78, Decision of 16 
July 1980, 147, para 4.  
119 Navalny v Russia, Application Nos 29580/12 and four others, GC Judgment of 15 November 2018, para 98. 
120 Nowak (n 10) 483-4 (observing that the delegates failed to explain why this argument applied to freedom of 
assembly in particular); MJ Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987) 415-16; UNGA, ‘Draft International Covenants on 
Human Rights’ (1 July 1955) UN Doc A/2929, paras 139-40.  
121 ibid Nowak, 484 n 12. 
122 Revised draft of General Comment No 37 (November 2019), para 4. 
123 Tatár and Fáber (n 13). 
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While the Strasbourg Court has examined solo-demonstrations under Article 10 ECHR 
(expression), taking into account the general principles established in the context of Article 11 
(assembly),124 the approach of the UN Human Rights Committee has not been so consistent. 
The Committee has distinguished from an assembly the act of a single individual peacefully 
conveying a message,125  and in seven cases, assembly claims under Article 21 ICCPR have 
been declared inadmissible on the basis that only a single individual was involved.126 However, 
in two single-person-protest cases, Article 21 claims were deemed admissible, only for the 
Committee then to decide not to examine them further (in light of the finding of a violation of 
article 19).127 More critically, in three further cases, the Committee found a violation of Article 
21 in relation to single-person pickets.128  
It is argued here that single-person protests should be considered under Article 19 ICCPR, 
taking into account any relevant principles deriving from Article 21. However, this seemingly 
straightforward position becomes more difficult to implement where a lone protester is joined 
by others. Questions then arise as to the circumstances in which two (or more) individuals 
should be counted as the sum of their actions – as a ‘combination’ rather than ‘mere 
aggregation’129 – so as primarily to engage Article 21. Two responses to this conundrum are 
suggested. 
First, we can quickly dispense of any argument that an assembly might be constituted (or 
the numerical threshold met) by virtue of a gathered audience.130 On this point, the European 
Court of Human Rights has rightly stated, ‘a solo demonstration should not be classified as an 
assembly merely because it attracted attention from the public.’131  
Second, in deciding whether or not the right of peaceful assembly is engaged, each 
gathering must be assessed on its own facts. Here, a range of factors may be relevant – 
including the spatial proximity of participants, temporal synchronicity of individual actions, 
unity of purpose, degree of logistical co-ordination and participants’ intention to gather with 
others (on which, see further C below). As such, while multiple lone and uncoordinated protests 
addressing disparate issues might still conceivably be considered as separate acts of expression, 
other combinations of individuals – whether spontaneous or planned – ought to obtain 
protection as assemblies under the aegis of Article 21. This argument holds even if the form of 
assembly is deliberately chosen to circumvent domestic notification requirements or laws 
prohibiting small gatherings132 or to swamp the authorities with individual notifications.133 On 
this basis, gatherings such as the silent stand protests in Egypt in 2010134 and the ‘standing 
man’ protests in Turkey in June 2013 would qualify as assemblies despite their framing as 
spontaneous individual ‘stands’ against police violence.135 So too would collective hand-
 
124 Section II above. Also, Novikova and Others v Russia, Application Nos 25501/07 and four others, Judgment 
of 26 April 2016, para 91; Mead (n 38) 66. 
125 Sviridov v Kazakhstan, Views adopted 13 July 2017, UN Doc CCPR/C/120/D/2158/2012, para 10.4.  
126 Eg Coleman v Australia, Views adopted 17 July 2006, UN Doc CCPR/C/87D/1157/2003, para 6.4; Levinov v 
Belarus, Views adopted 19 July 2018, UN Doc CCPR/C/123/D/2235/2013, para 5.7. 
127 Katsora (n 50); Protsko and Tolchin (n 50). 
128 Poplavny v Belarus, Views adopted 5 November 2015, UN Doc CCPR/C/115/D/2019/2010; Sudalenko v 
Belarus, Views adopted 5 November 2015, UN Doc CCPR/C/115/D/2016/2010; and MT v Uzbekistan, Views 
adopted 23 July 2015, UN Doc CCPR/C/114/D/2234/2013. 
129 Baker, text to n 86. 
130 cf the State party’s argument in Coleman (n 129) paras 4.2 and 4.6. 
131 Novikova (n 127) paras 204-5. 
132 Eg M Abdellah and E Blair, ‘Online protest on Egyptian's death draws hundreds’ (Reuters, 9 July 2010). 
133 Eg A Mostrous, ‘Comedian calls for “mass lone demonstration”’ (The Guardian, 24 August 2006). 
134 Gerbaudo (n 106) 60; Z Tufekci and C Wilson, ‘Social media and the decision to participate in political 
protest: Observations from Tahrir Square’ (2012) 62 Journal of Communication 363. 
135 Both actions had some measure of coordination – in Egypt, via the Facebook group, ‘We Are All Khaled Said’, 
and in Turkey, adopting the hashtag, ‘#durandam’. 
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clapping from either door-steps or balconies in support of health workers during the COVID-
19 pandemic (and notwithstanding regulations to enforce physical distancing). 
 
B. Participation and Non-participation 
 
Questions about the nature of individual participation in a collective enterprise – who may 
participate, and how they do so – are highly relevant to mapping the scope of the right of 
peaceful assembly (and thus, to determining whether, on the facts of a given case, the right is 
engaged).  
It is worth noting that the Human Rights Committee in its Concluding Observations has 
repeatedly emphasized that the right to freedom of peaceful assembly can be exercised not only 
by ‘citizens’,136 but also by non-citizens (including migrant workers,137 and refugees and 
asylum-seekers).138 This goes some way also to recognizing that freedom of assembly is often 
of critical importance to groups most at risk.139 The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
additionally makes clear that ‘States Parties should recognize’ the right of the child to freedom 
of peaceful assembly.140  
In addition to the question of who may participate, there are a range of roles – undertaken 
by both assembly participants and non-participants – that might properly fall within the scope 
of ‘assembly’ and thus engage Article 21. As Nowak argues, the Article 21 right also ‘covers 
both the preparing and conducting of an assembly by its organizers and the right to participate 
in it.’141 Particular consideration here is given to those who have a role in (1) organizing and 
planning, (2) publicizing and promoting, and (3) monitoring, observing or reporting on 
assemblies, as well as (4) prior or subsequent activities that are intrinsic to assembling. These 
questions may be particularly important in determining the admissibility of claims to be a 
victim of a violation under Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant. 
 
1. Organizing and planning 
 
Many States have enacted legal provisions that define an assembly ‘organizer’ for regulatory 
purposes – requiring, for example, that there be some kind of organizing committee, that the 
organizer (or their representative) be present at an assembly, or reserving for organizers 
particularly serious penalties for either violence that occurs or deviation from the permitted 
schedule or route. It is important, however, to consider from a protective (rather than 
regulatory) perspective the organizational roles that might engage the right of peaceful 
assembly.   
The first point to note is that Article 21 ICCPR confers certain rights on assembly 
organizers. Aside from possible rights of exclusion,142 the right has also been held to include 
‘the right to choose a location within sight and sound of their target audience’143 – or, in the 
 
136 Eg Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of Kuwait’ (11 August 
2016) UN Doc CCPR/C/KWT/CO/3, para 42. 
137 Eg Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the sixth periodic report of the Dominican 
Republic’ (27 November 2017) UN Doc CCPR/C/DOM/CO/6, para 31. 
138 Eg Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Nepal’ (15 April 
2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/NPL/CO/2, para 14. 
139 UNSR FoAA, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association, Maina Kiai’ (14 April 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/26/29. 
140 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by UN 
GA Res 44/25 of 20 November 1989; entry into force, 2 September 1990, Art 15. 
141 Nowak (n 10) 483. 
142 Text to n 94 – n 98 above. 
143 Eg Turchenyak v Belarus, Views adopted 24 July 2013, UN Doc CCPR/C/108/D/1948/2010, para 7.4.  
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words of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘to choose the time, place and modalities of 
the assembly …’144  
Second, there is no specific organizational structure that is intrinsic to the concept of 
‘assembly’. There are different views as to whether assemblies are ever mobilized through 
purely non-hierarchical ‘horizontal networks’ without organizers or leaders, or whether instead 
they depend on more diffuse forms of (‘leaderful’) organization with multiple leaders 
performing different, but nonetheless, crucial roles.145 Paulo Gerbaudo, for example, is 
sceptical of ‘pure spontaneity’ and ‘the ideology of structurelessness’, arguing that this can 
become ‘an astute way of side-stepping the question of leadership, and allows the de facto 
leaders to remain unaccountable because invisible’.146 He suggests instead that the act of 
assembling is ‘underscored by complex communicative and organisational practices, allowing 
for groups which are spatially dispersed but united by the same interests.’147 The point here, 
however, is that Article 21 must be interpreted in such a way as to recognize this diversity of 
organizational and choreographic activities.148  
Such an approach might arguably open the door to spurious claims by those who have had 
relatively minor logistical or leadership roles. However, since Article 21 protections generally 
also extend to participation (aside from any particular role that an individual might have 
played), this is unlikely to make a substantial difference in practice. Moreover, it seems 
reasonable to expect that protection should keep pace with potential liability – and in this 
regard, it is notable that several States have attempted to cast the organizational net widely in 
order to impose sanctions – particularly in relation to those who publicize or promote an 
assembly (as considered below).149  
 
2. Publicizing and promoting 
 
A number of individual communications considered by the Human Rights Committee have 
involved the imposition of penalties on assembly organizers or others for announcing or 
publicizing an upcoming assembly prior to official authorization being granted.150 Online 
communication platforms increase not only the ease of sharing such information, but also the 
likelihood that it will be shared by a wide range of individuals beyond the primary 
organizers.151 
The Committee’s stated view – that the circulation of publicity for an upcoming assembly 
cannot legitimately be penalized in the absence of a ‘specific indication of what dangers would 
have been created by the early distribution of the information’152 – is directed primarily at the 
justification of limitations, but it also implicitly accepts that such activities are protected under 
the Covenant. Such promotional activities inevitably involve acts of communication 
 
144 Sáska v Hungary, Application No 58050/08, Judgment of 27 November 2012, para 21; Women on Waves v 
Portugal, Application No 31276/05, Judgment of 3 February 2009 (French only), paras 30 and 38-39. 
145 Eg P Ruiz, Articulating Dissent: Protest and the Public Sphere (Pluto Press 2014) 123-4; KD Opp, Theories 
of Political Protest and Social Movements: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Critique and Synthesis (Routledge 
2009) 82.  
146 Gerbaudo (n 106) 19, 25 and 43; Hardt and Negri (n 23) xiv (reclaiming the concept of ‘entrepreneurship’). 
147 Gerbaudo (n 106) 39-40. 
148 ibid, 12-13.     
149 In at least three cases, the Committee has noted (but not further addressed) the author’s claim not to have been 
an assembly organizer – Belyazeka (n 47) paras 2.7 and 5.3; Kim v Uzbekistan (n 47), paras 7.2 and 13.5; 
Kovalenko v Belarus, Views adopted 17 July 2013, UN Doc CCPR/C/108/D1808/2008, para 5.3. 
150 Eg Zhagiparov v Kazakhstan, Views adopted 25 October 2018, CCPR/124/D/2441/2014; Sviridov (n 128) para 
2.1. 
151 ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Clément 
Voule’, 26 July 2018, UN Doc A/HRC/38/34, para 82. 
152 Tulzhenkova v Belarus, Views adopted 26 October 2011, UN Doc CCPR/C/103/D/1838/2008, para. 9.3.  
 17 
 
implicating the right to freedom of expression under Article 19(2). In addition, however, they 
are also of critical importance to an effective right of peaceful assembly. The Committee has 
considered some ‘publicity’ cases under Article 19(2) alone –  generally, where the author has 
raised a complaint only under this provision.153 Where claims have been raised under both 
Articles 19(2) and 21, the Article 21 complaint has been deemed admissible but not considered 
further in two cases,154 whereas in three other cases, the Committee found violations of both 
Article 19(2) and 21 together.155 It is suggested here that restrictions on publicizing and 
promoting an assembly should engage Article 21 as a matter of course (or at a minimum, 
Article 19 in the light of Article 21).156 Here, the revised draft text of General Comment No 37 
helpfully emphasizes that ‘dissemination of information about an upcoming event’ is covered 
by Article 21. Moreover, ‘publicity for an upcoming assembly before notification has taken 
place cannot be penalized in the absence of a specific indication of what dangers would have 
been created by the early distribution of the information.’157 
 
3. Non-participants – monitors, observers and journalists 
 
The obligation to protect both journalists covering demonstrations and the varied work of 
assembly monitors and observers arises from the need to create an enabling environment for 
the right of peaceful assembly. As such, where journalists, monitors or observers claim there 
to have been undue interferences with their work relating to an assembly, and despite the fact 
that they themselves are avowedly non-participants, it is argued here that Article 21 ought still 
to be engaged.158 Such work is essential to the full and effective realization of the right of 
peaceful assembly. 
While the European Court of Human Rights has so far viewed such activities primarily 
through the prism of freedom of expression (recognizing Article 11 as lex generalis),159 the 
Human Rights Committee, in Zhagiparov v Kazakhstan,160 found that the arrest and 
prosecution of a journalist by the Kazakh authorities for participating in an unsanctioned 
public gathering in Astana (resulting in 15 days administrative arrest) not only violated his 
right to freedom of expression, but also his right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 
21.161 This latter conclusion is perhaps surprising since the journalist’s alleged ‘participation’ 
in the assembly was itself at the heart of the legal challenge: the violation of the right of 
assembly was premised not on his participation in the demonstration but precisely on his denial 
that he was participating at all. In this light, the Committee properly affirmed that actual 
participation is not a sine qua non for Article 21 to be engaged. 
 
153 Eg Olechkevitch v Belarus, Views adopted 18 March 2013, CCPR/C/107/D/1785/2008. 
154 Katsora (n 50) paras 6.4 and 7.6; Protsko and Tolchin v Belarus (n 50) paras 6.6 and 7.9.  
155 Govsha, Syritsa and Mezyak (n 15); Zhagiparov v Kazakhstan (n 153); Melnikov v Belarus, Views adopted 
14 July 2017, UN Doc CCPR/C/120/D/2147/2012.  
156 Similarly, Concurring Opinion of Committee members, Mr Fabián Salvioli, Mr Yuval Shany and Mr Víctor 
Rodríguez Rescia in Olechkevitch (n 156) paras 2, 8 and 9. 
157 Revised draft of General Comment No 37 (November 2019) para 37. 
158 The question of whether such protection ought to be grounded in Article 21 specifically (or the Covenant 
more generally) is, at the time of writing, unresolved in the revised draft text of General Comment No 37. 
Consensus on the language was not reached during the first reading of the text of para 34 (as signalled by the 
inclusion of ‘Article 21’ in parenthesis): ‘The role of journalists, human rights defenders and others involved in 
monitoring … are entitled to protection under [Article 21 of] the Covenant.’ The first draft of the General 
Comment stated that: ‘The role of journalists and other monitors … is protected under Article 21 and its related 
rights.’ 
159 Najafli v Azerbaijan, Application No 2594/07, Judgment of 2 October 2012, para 66; Butkevich (n 34) para 
122. 
160 Zhagiparov (n 153). 
161 ibid, para 13.5. 
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The Committee’s finding in Zhagiparov aligns with the views of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association who has similarly 
emphasized that ‘the right of peaceful assembly covers not only the right to hold and to 
participate in a peaceful assembly but also … further protects those monitoring peaceful 
assemblies.’162 In like manner, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media has argued 
that ‘uninhibited reporting on demonstrations is as much a part of the right to free assembly as 
the demonstrations are themselves the exercise of the right to free speech.’163  
 
4. Prior or subsequent activities intrinsic to an assembly 
 
It is clear from the foregoing that the right of peaceful assembly extends not only to the duration 
of an assembly as an ‘event’ but also covers activities occurring within a much wider temporal 
span – not because they constitute an assembly but because they are essential to the exercise 
of the right. John Inazu argues that ‘just as freedom of speech guards against restrictions 
imposed prior to an act of speaking, assembly guards against restrictions imposed prior to an 
act of assembling – it protects a group’s autonomy, composition, and existence.’164 
The Human Rights Committee has recognized this dimension of the Article 21 right, 
finding a violation of Articles 19 and 21 in a case where the authors were detained on their way 
to the venue of a demonstration due to take place:  
 
‘The prevention of the authors to hold a demonstration, their subsequent 
apprehension and sentencing … merely for walking in a group of individuals holding 
photographs and posters clearly constitutes a violation of their rights guaranteed 
under articles 19 and 21 …’165 
 
While there have been few cases focused exclusively on alleged interferences in the immediate 
aftermath of an assembly,166 it is argued here that Article 21 should apply equally in such 
circumstances, such as when participants are dispersing or using public transport to make their 
way home. Such activities are integral to the act of assembling and should not fall outside its 
protective reach. In this regard, the draft text of General Comment No 37 properly recognizes 
that ‘[a]ctivities conducted outside the immediate scope of the gathering but that are integral 
to making the exercise meaningful are also covered’ including (amongst other acts) both 
travelling to and leaving an assembly.167 
 
C. From Incidental to Intentional and from Political to Recreational and Commercial 
 
It was argued in Sections III and IV(A) that the collective nature of an assembly is a necessary, 
but of itself, insufficient constituent element of a definition of ‘assembly’. As such, some 
additional purposive requirement might additionally be required to draw a definitional 
threshold.  
 
162 UNSR FoAA (n 107) ‘Summary’. 
163 OSCE Representative on the Freedom of the Media, ‘Special Report: Handling of the media during political 
demonstrations – Observations and Recommendations’ (21 June 2007). Though note the arguments in Section 
3B above (text to n 46- n 69). 
164 Inazu (n 60) 152. 
165 Eg Evrezov, Nepomnyaschikh, Polyakov and Rybchenko v Belarus, Views adopted 10 October 2014, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/112/D/1999/2010, paras 2.1 and 8.5-8.6. The question is less one of temporal proximity to the 
assembly, but whether the antecedent or subsequent activities are intrinsic to it. 
166 Eg Navalnyy and Yashin v Russia, Application No 76204/11, Judgment of 4 December 2014, especially the 
Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque at para 12. 
167 Revised draft of General Comment No 37 (November 2019) para 37. 
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Like Nowak, the definitions of the UNSR, OSCE/ODIHR and ACHPR all emphasize 
intentionality in addition to requiring a further purposive element (respectively, a ‘specific 
purpose’, a ‘common expressive purpose’ and an ‘expressive purpose’).168 However, 
notwithstanding an initial proposal by the Human Rights Committee’s Rapporteur (Mr Christof 
Heyns) during the second reading of General Comment No 37 to define assembly as ‘an 
intentional gathering … principally with an expressive purpose’,169 five members of the 
Committee expressed reservations about the invocation of ‘intentionality’.170 Following this 
relatively truncated debate, the Committee decided to excise the word ‘intentional’ from the 
adopted definition, opting instead to define an assembly simply as a ‘gathering … for a specific 
purpose, primarily with an expressive goal’.171 
It is worth highlighting the implications of the Committee’s rejection of ‘intentional’ 
(particularly, if this formulation survives the second reading stage). At its core, the question 
raised is whether every happenstance gathering of individuals is, ipso facto an ‘assembly’ – a 
question that can usefully be interrogated using the heuristic of the proverbial bus stop queue. 
Such a queue satisfies several elements of Manfred Nowak’s definition: it is a gathering of 
several persons for a specific purpose (ie waiting for a bus). As noted, however, Nowak and 
others have argued that an assembly must also be intentional: while a bus queue participant 
might intend to wait for a bus (and this would satisfy the ‘specific purpose’ element) she or he 
might be entirely agnostic as to whether others join (and so have no intention to assemble). 
While a bus stop queue would certainly also falter at the more exacting requirement in some 
definitions of having an ‘expressive’ or ‘common expressive’ purpose, such formulations are 
problematic, as suggested in section III(B) above, because they unduly tether assembly to 
expression.172 
In its own Guide to Article 11 ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights emphatically 
excludes queues from the scope of the term ‘assembly’, characterizing a queue to enter a public 
building as a ‘random agglomeration of individuals each pursuing their own cause’.173 Instead, 
the Court argues that ‘[a]ssembly is defined, in particular, by a common purpose of its 
participants.’174 In like manner, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, in his concurring opinion in 
Navalnyy and Yashin v Russia, specifically argued that ‘[t]he incidental meeting of a group of 
people is not an assembly, even if these people interact for a certain period of time’.175 He 
suggested instead that an assembly requires ‘the shared intent of its members to pursue a 
common aim through a common action.’176 
 
168 Text to n 107 – n 114 above. 
169 Advanced by the Human Rights Committee’s Rapporteur for the General Comment (Mr Christof Heyns):  
UN Web TV, n 111 above, 1.14:00-1.16:40. Two Committee members (Mr Zimmermann and Mr Santos Pais) 
also spoke in favour of retaining ‘intention’ as an element of the definition. 
170 UN Web TV, n 111, 1:16:45-1:39:10.The reservations variously expressed by Committee members regarding 
‘intentionality’ were that (1) it complicates the definition and may curtail spontaneous assemblies; (2) it is 
unclear whose intention is being referred to; (3) the notion of an ‘intentional assembly’ is somewhat 
tautologous; (4) ‘intention’ has criminal law connotations and might operate to exclude bystanders from 
protection; and (5) intention adds little to the definition and unhelpfully incorporates a subjective element that 
might then need to be proven. 
171 UN Web TV, n 111, 1:38:55. 
172 Importantly, the Committee’s revised formulation (‘primarily with an expressive goal’) leaves the door open 
to non-expressive assemblies. For further critique of a ‘common expressive purpose’ requirement, see M 
Scheinin, ‘How to Improve the Human Rights Committee Draft General Comment on Freedom of Assembly’ 
(Just Security, 13 February 2020). 
173 European Court of Human Rights (2019) (n 3) para 14. 
174 ibid. 




That said, there are at least three reasons why one might intuitively favour a definition that 
extends to entirely coincidental gatherings and each is briefly examined here in turn. It is 
suggested, however, that none withstands closer scrutiny and so even an inclusive and 
protective definition of ‘assembly’ (as favoured here) should be more narrowly cabined by 
insisting on a specific intention to gather. 
First, one might query whether there is ultimately any real harm in adopting an all-
inclusive protective definition of assembly, one that would comfortably absorb a bus stop 
queue. After all, there is neither a finite well of protection nor reason to presumptively reject a 
rights-based claim simply because it falls at the definitional periphery and might be asserted 
infrequently. The strongest rebuttal of this pragmatic ‘benign absorption’ argument is that it 
ultimately yields a definition of assembly devoid of descriptive plausibility and might trivialize 
what has been recognized as a fundamental right:177 By embracing all kinds of incidental group, 
the substance of the right might lose its normative edge and its key protections be taken less 
seriously by States. While the principle of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern 
itself with trifles) could provide something of a corrective by precluding judicial consideration 
of trivial allegations falling below a minimum level of severity – a de minimus threshold fails 
to rescue the definitional principle at stake (and indeed, fails to provide any guidance as to 
where precisely the line between trivial and non-trivial assemblies ought to be drawn). 
Second, it might appear rather suspect if protection falls short of the very activities 
vulnerable to undue interference, regulatory or otherwise. Conceivably, those standing at a bus 
stop might encounter third-party violence or State restriction. Consider, for example, Public 
Spaces Protection Orders (PSPOs) in the UK, several of which have expressly prohibited 
loitering at bus stops.178 If individuals gathering at a bus stop (irrespective of intention or any 
interaction that may have occurred) were to face criminal penalty for breaching such an Order, 
they may well wish to invoke the protections afforded by Article 21. However, neither the risk 
of violence nor the possibility of State regulation are sufficient to convert an incidental 
gathering at a bus stop (or elsewhere) into an ‘assembly’. While the right of peaceful assembly 
should protect against undue regulation of assemblies, the term ‘assembly’ need not itself be 
defined mimetically by every interference capable of touching a coincidental gathering of 
individuals. As such, there is no necessary contradiction in recognizing the unfathomable risks 
posed by third parties to queue participants, or the deleterious breadth of widely framed 
regulatory powers, while simultaneously adopting a more narrow protective definition of 
‘assembly’. 
If the potential disjuncture between an activity’s susceptibility to interference and the 
scope of protection as an assembly can be rejected as a reason to embrace entirely coincidental 
gatherings within its fold, we might instead be drawn to a third reason favouring the inclusion 
of bus stop queues and the like – one that more vividly conveys a sense of the value of 
‘assembly’. This third reason emphasizes the capacity of assemblies to enable what Michel de 
Certeau termed the ‘politics of stimulation’, reliant on the possibility of spontaneous 
interaction.179 As de Certeau himself remarked, such chance encounters, deserving of 
protection, might occur ‘… at bus stops, in lines in front of administration windows, before the 
array of goods at market stands … at the exits of schools … at the laundromat or in the café, in 
all of these familiar and public places that are neither yours or mine, that are made for passing 
 
177 Eg Turchenyak (n 146) para. 7.4; Praded (n 46) para. 7.4; Korol (n 11) para 7.5; Kim (n 47) para 13.4. 
178 Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, s 59. Within the first two years of the Act coming into 
force, 12 of the 130 PSPOs imposed (across 79 local authority areas) restricted congregating or loitering in 
groups 
<https://democracy.walthamforest.gov.uk/documents/s66446/3a%20-
%20Appendix%201%20PSPO%20Executive%20Decision%20report.pdf> at 4.  
179 M de Certeau, The Capture of Speech and Other Political Writings (University of Minnesota Press 1997) 96. 
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through …’180 This rationale resonates with Orsolya Salát’s argument that ‘standing in a queue 
as such is not an assembly, but it can easily turn into one, for instance if people outraged by 
the waiting time start discussing how to handle it or start protesting against it.’181  
Salát’s position has intuitive appeal – but we need to be more precise about what turns a 
non-assembly queue into an assembly. On Salát’s own account, it is not the mere presence of 
two or more people – rather, the common presence element of her definition implies ‘some link 
with each other beyond the mere coincidence of being at the same place at the same time’182 
and that ‘the link might be some shared activity, emotion, opinion or the like’.183 Yet the point 
at which non-verbal activity might elevate a queue (or particular queue participants) into an 
‘assembly’ remains elusive. Salát’s argument implies that any conversation (or even shared 
non-verbal reaction) could serve to convert a happenstance gathering into a protected 
‘assembly’. Such a conclusion has implications that we may be reluctant to accept – its logic 
implies that any kind of solidarity (however signaled) could be constitutive of an ‘assembly’.  
To resolve the bus stop queue conundrum, it is suggested that instead of mere ‘presence’, 
a credible definition of ‘assembly’ under Article 21 should exclude entirely coincidental 
gatherings and require that a gathering be ‘intentional’ (in the sense that participants have a 
specific intention to gather with others).184 This approach does not deny the importance of de 
Certeau’s politics of stimulation but stops short of classifying every such stimulating 
interaction as an assembly. Moreover, bus stop queues might sometimes qualify as assemblies. 
Consider, for example, if  bus stops became the last refuge for dissenters in a country where 
public gatherings involving more than two people were prohibited.185 Where dissenters 
intentionally congregate at a particular place, they are not merely waiting for a bus (indeed, 
they might not be waiting for a bus at all), but instead intend to gather. This argument also 
holds for types of gathering that might ordinarily be coincidental but come to be imbued with 
meaning (or are deliberately subverted to convey a particular point) when other forms of 
assembly (demonstrations and marches) are suppressed. Examples might include ‘peace 
prayers’ in the former German Democratic Republic,186 hand-clapping protests in Belarus,187 
walk-to-work protests in Uganda188 and a Saturday ‘stroll’ in Moscow.189 
 
D. Purpose: from Political to Recreational and Commercial Assemblies 
 
The UN Special Rapporteur’s definition of ‘assembly’ follows Nowak in using the broad term 
‘specific purpose’ (as distinct from the OSCE/ODIHR’s preference for ‘common expressive 
purpose’). Indeed, it is noteworthy that none of the key definitions of noted above attempt to 
limit ‘assembly’ to political or non-commercial events. That said, the November 2019 draft of 
General Comment No 37 suggested that ‘commercial gatherings would not generally fall 
 
180 ibid, 98-99.  
181 Salát (n 61) 4. 
182 ibid. 
183 ibid. 
184 This broadly aligns with Inazu’s definition of a group as requiring there to be some shared enterprise. Inazu 
(n 87) 1094, n 2.  
185 Eg ‘Thai army bans groups of more than five people from gathering’ (Reuters, 22 May 2014). 
186 L Peter, ‘East Germany 1989 – the march that KO’d communism’ (BBC News, 14 October 2019). 
187 J Motlagh, ‘In Belarus, Clapping Can Be Subversive’ (The Atlantic, 21 July 2011). 
188 ‘Uganda: Police tear gas 'walk-to-work' protesters’ (BBC News, 14 April 2011). 




within the scope of what is protected by Article 21’ and that such gatherings would be protected 
‘only to the extent that they have an expressive purpose’.190 
Assemblies are often valued on account of their contribution to political life. Tabatha Abu 
El-Haj, for example, argues that assemblies are ‘by definition, political experiences’, offering 
a unique, distinctive form of political participation which ‘strengthen the likelihood of future 
civic and political engagement’.191 ‘Assembling’ she writes ‘is a critically important form of 
politics because it provides opportunities to strengthen, even create, personal relationships that 
are likely to encourage additional civic and political participation.’192 
The political role of assemblies should not be underplayed – not merely as an adjunct to 
representative politics, but as an alternative form of participation: As Eric Barendt has argued, 
‘put most radically’, the right of assembly is valuable for active citizens who ‘are unwilling to 
participate in conventional party politics’. Assemblies serve precisely to challenge ‘the 
exclusivity of conventional modes of civic activity’.193 Nonetheless, a narrow and exclusively 
political conception of assembly not only overlooks gatherings that might be regarded as either 
pre-political or wholly apolitical, but forecloses the agonistic space, always in the making, 
within and through which new political constellations may emerge.194 It is not merely that non-
political and quotidian gatherings somehow precede the political,195 but that they are valuable 
in their own right.196 They exist, in Jack Balkin’s words, as the ‘infrastructure or substrate’ for 
political democracy.197 This argument is further strengthened if we accept John Dewey’s 
contention that democracy ‘is more than a form of government; it is primarily a form of 
associated living, a conjoint communicated experience.’198 On this basis, we ought to resist any 
straightforward hierarchy that purports to afford heightened protection to ‘political assemblies’ 
(however construed).199  
This point has been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights. While the Court 
has, on the one hand, emphasized that ‘very strong reasons’ must be advanced to justify 
restrictions on political speech or serious matters of public interest’ and that the same principle 
applies to assemblies under Article 11 ECHR – ‘public events related to political life in the 
country or at the local level must enjoy strong protection’200 – the Court has also noted that it 
would ‘be an unacceptably narrow interpretation of [Article 11] to confine it only to that kind 
of assembly.’201 The Court has therefore acknowledged that the right of peaceful assembly 
 
190 Revised draft General Comment No 37 (November 2019) at para 14 (under the heading, ‘Scope of the right 
of peaceful assembly’). By way of comparison, the first draft of the General Comment, at para 15, stated that: 
‘Gatherings that primarily have a commercial or social entertainment purpose would not generally fall within 
the core of what is protected under Article 21, although they may also be otherwise protected.’ 
191 El-Haj (n 81) 1031. 
192 ibid 1031-2. 
193 E Barendt, ‘Freedom of Assembly’ in J Beatson and Y Cripps, Freedom of Expression and Freedom of 
Information (OUP 2000) 168. 
194 N Fraser ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy’ 
(1990) 25-26 Social Text 71; Similarly, Butler (n 23) 205-6. 
195 Inazu (n 60) 5. 
196 R Post, ‘Participatory Democracy and Free Speech’ (2011) 97 Va L Rev 486. 
197 JM Balkin, ‘Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment’ (2016) 110 Northwestern U L Rev 1060. 
198 J Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. 
(Collier-Macmillan 1966) 87. 
199 cf the revised (November 2019) draft of General Comment No 37 which, at para 36 stated: ‘Given that 
peaceful assemblies have an expressive function, and political speech enjoys particular protection as a form of 
expression, it follows that assemblies with a political message should likewise enjoy a heightened level of 
accommodation and protection.’ Importantly, this paragraph relates to the obligations of States parties rather 
than the scope of the right (and so arguably is of less concern in conceptual terms). 
200 Primov (n 55) paras 134-5.  




‘may extend to the protection of an assembly of an essentially social character’.202 This 
recognition chimes with an early draft text of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
which provided that ‘[t]here shall be freedom of peaceful assembly and of association for 
political, religious, cultural, scientific, professional and other purposes.’203 It is noteworthy too 
that the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in its General 
Recommendation No.35 (on Combating racist hate speech) expressly covers ‘behaviour at 
public gatherings including sporting events’.204 
The inevitable corollary of a prioritization of the political is the relegation of non-political 
assemblies. In particular, this is to the detriment of gatherings that might be considered 
‘recreational’205 or ‘commercial’.206 Recreational and commercially oriented gatherings will 
often have political dimensions too. Consider, for example, the profoundly political nature of 
the Olympic Games207 or collective actions inspired by the ‘take a knee’ protest begun by 
American footballer Colin Kaepernick.208 Consider too the commodification of the Berlin Love 
parade,209 or the ways in which Pride events often combine celebration, political advocacy and 
commercial enterprise (with floats advertising LGBT+ friendly clubs or ticketed headline 
events).210 In short, any attempt to create hermetic categories of non-political gathering is 
fraught with definitional pitfalls.   
Ultimately, considerations regarding the political significance of an event may have some 
purchase when it comes to ascertaining the extent of State obligations or assessing the necessity 
and proportionality of restrictions. As such, for example, there may legitimately be some 
defraying of costs to an organizer where an assembly is partly or principally for-profit (such 
redistribution constituting a restriction that must survive proportionality-based scrutiny). 
Similarly, with avowedly political assemblies, there might properly be ‘a thumb on the scale’ 
of such an assembly when weighed against arguments to protect other competing rights – but 
this is not an argument that is fundamentally about the meaning and scope of ‘assembly’. As 
noted previously, not all types of assembly entail the discharge of the same state obligations. 
 
E. Space and Place 
 
The final definitional element that must be considered is the question of space and place. The 
uniquely spatial dimensions of assembly were discussed (in section III) to help distinguish 
assembly from association. Noting the absence of any mention of space or place in Nowak’s 
definition,211 it is important to consider whether the intrinsic spatial characteristics of 
 
202 ibid; Huseynov v Azerbaijan, Application No 59135/09, 7 May 2015, para 91; European Court of Human 
Rights (n 3), para 116. 
203 ‘Report of the Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Human Rights’ UN Doc E/CN.4/21, 78 (Annex 
F): Article 23 (emphasis added). 
204 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), ‘General Recommendation No 35: 
Combating racist hate speech’, 26 September 2013, UN Doc CERD/C/GC/35, para 7. 
205 G Abernathy, The Right of Assembly and Association (University of South Carolina Press 1961) 109. Also, 
Mead (n 38) 137 and 152 (albeit in relation to protest). 
206 Inazu (n 60) 168.  
207 D Zirin, ‘John Carlos Responds to the New Olympics Ban on Political Protest’ (The Nation, 14 January 
2020). 
208 C Mindock ‘Taking a knee: Why are NFL players protesting and when did they start to kneel?’ (The 
Independent, 4 February 2019). 
209 J Borneman and S Senders, ‘Politics without a Head: Is the “Love Parade” a New Form of Political 
Identification’ (2000) 15(2) Cultural Anthropology 294.  
210 In 2019, tickets for Manchester Pride, headlined by Ariana Grande, cost £71: ‘That’s a bit rich’ (The 
Guardian, 4 February 2019). 
211 Text to n 103 above. 
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‘assembly’ need be expressly articulated (and if so, how best to capture this dimension).212 To 
this end, it is worth recalling the different definitional formulations of ‘assembly’ that have 
already been highlighted – ‘private or public space’ in the UN Special Rapporteur’s definition, 
‘in private or in public’ in the ACHPR’s Guidelines, ‘publicly accessible place’ in the 
OSCE/ODIHR – Venice Commission Guidelines, and the (welcome) inclusive formulation in 
General Comment No 37 (adopted during the course of its second reading): ‘wherever they 
may take place: outdoors, indoors and online, and in public and private spaces, or in a 
combination of these.’213 
Importantly, the UN Human Rights Committee has already recognized that the right of 
peaceful assembly ‘… entails the possibility of organizing and participating in peaceful 
assemblies … including in enclosed premises, open areas or public or private spaces …’214 The 
Article 21 right has been interpreted to confer protection ‘in a public location’,215 assemblies 
inside buildings,216 privately-owned venues,217 and in places that the State has argued are not 
intended for assemblies.218 The Committee has also emphasized in its Concluding Observations 
that States should make sufficient spaces available for assemblies.219 These expansive 
protections are premised on the fact that everything falling within the protective scope of 
Article 21 may in any case be subject to necessary and proportionate restriction. 
Beyond reiterating these already clear statements regarding the scope of Article 21 
(particularly, the principle that the right of peaceful assembly extends to private spaces), it is 
perhaps unclear what gains may accrue from expressly defining the spatial dimensions of 
assembly. In this regard, at least two further questions are worth addressing briefly in turn: (1) 
is it beneficial to couch the spatial scope of ‘assembly’ in terms of access rather than ownership 
– in other words, invoking the phrase ‘publicly accessible’ rather than ‘public and private’ 
spaces? and (2) should the right of peaceful assembly under Article 21 confer protection upon 
forms of gathering that occur in online spaces or in the virtual world (rather than merely upon 
physical, real-world gatherings)? 
Some of the definitions of ‘assembly’ previously noted frame the spatial entitlements of 
those wishing to assemble in terms of property access rather than ownership.220 The difference 
is important – privately-owned places may to all intents and purposes be public and publicly-
owned spaces may not be accessible to the public all of the time (think, for example, of an 
office in a town hall). Invoking the idea of ‘public accessibility’ thus seeks to recognize 
legitimate barriers to publicly-owned property not ordinarily accessible while not 
presumptively excluding assemblies from privately-owned property to which access is 
routinely granted (including, for example, town centres and garage forecourts).  
Decentring questions of ownership in this way may be well-intentioned, but the notion of 
‘public accessibility’ fundamentally under-protects the right of peaceful assembly when it 
purports to define its scope. It implicitly qualifies the more expansive assertion that the right 
 
212 Recalling Tatár and Fáber (n 24), para 38. 
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extends to assemblies in all privately-owned spaces (subject to necessary and proportionate 
restriction) implying instead that it extends only to privately-owned spaces that are ordinarily 
accessible. Indeed, it prematurely seeks to resolve questions of access that should instead be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis when scrutinizing the necessity and proportionality of 
restrictions. In this regard, a number of nuanced domestic court judgments illustrate well how 
assembly rights could be protected against absolutist and exclusionary assertions of property 
rights.221 Moreover, the notion of ‘public accessibility’ defers to and reinforces existing patterns 
of access and use, offering no normative steer as to what ought to be accessible.222 On this 
basis, a definition of assembly that leaves open the possibility that assemblies may take place 
in private spaces is preferable to one that more ambitiously attempts to resolve rights of access 
at the level of definition. 
One could therefore be forgiven for following Nowak and simply saying nothing at all 
about the intrinsic spatial dimension of assembly. However, there is normative advantage to 
emphasizing, within any definitional formulation, its broad spatial scope. Doing so provides 
both clarity and iterative weight – and this may be especially important in relation to both 
private spaces (as above) and the question of whether ‘assembly’ extends to gatherings in 
online spaces – to which discussion now turns.  
The UN Human Rights Council, in two successive resolutions in 2012 and 2013, 
emphasized the obligation of States ‘to respect and fully protect the rights of all individuals to 
assemble peacefully and associate freely, online as well as offline.’223 Subsequently, the UN 
Special Rapporteurs on freedom of assembly and of association, and on extrajudicial, summary 
or arbitrary executions, stated in a joint report in 2016 that ‘it has been recognized that human 
rights protections, including for freedom of assembly, may apply to analogous interactions 
taking place online’224 – phrasing that was echoed in a further UN Human Rights Council 
Resolution in 2018.225It is generally accepted that cyberspace contains many forums rather than 
being a single undifferentiated whole.226 Some such online spaces may be private (with access 
granted only on request or invitation) while others may be privately-owned but publicly 
 
221 Eg German Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 18 July 2015 (‘Beer Can Flashmob for Freedom 
decision’), 1 BvQ 25/15; Judgment of the Amsterdam District Court in Shell Netherlands v Greenpeace, Case 
No 525686/KG ZA 12-1250. See, ‘Dutch court rejects Shell protest ban’ (BBC News, 5 October 2012). 
222 As Massey (n 101) 152 reminds us, the notion of ‘public space’ is often romanticized as an unencumbered 
‘emptiness’ freely open to all, whereas it is ‘produced’ through ongoing contestation (and legislation). 
223 UNHRC, ‘Resolution 21/16 on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association’ (11 October 
2012) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/21/16, para 1; UNHRC ‘Resolution 24/5 on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association’ (8 October 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/24/5, para 2; UNHRC, ‘Resolution 26/13 
on the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the internet’ (14 July 2014) UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/26/13, para 1. No similar statement appeared in either UNHRC, ‘Resolution 25/38 on the 
promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful protests’ (11 April 2014) UN Doc 
A/HRC/Res/25/38 or in UNHRC, ‘Resolution 31/37 on the promotion and protection of human rights in the 
context of peaceful protests’ (12 April 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/Res/31/37. 
224 ‘Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association and 
the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of 
assemblies’ (4 February 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/31/66, para 10. 
225 UNHRC, Resolution L.16 on ‘The promotion and protection of human rights in the context of peaceful 
protests’ (29 June 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/38/L.16: ‘although an assembly has generally been understood as a 
physical gathering of people, human rights protections, including for the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, 
of expression and of association, may apply to analogous interactions taking place online.’ For an overview of 
oral interventions by Council members relating to the Resolution, see ‘Human Rights Council adopts six 
resolutions, including on Syria, extends mandates on Belarus and on Eritrea’ (OHCHR, 6 July 2018). 
226 D Hunter, ‘Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons (2003) 91 California Law 
Review 490 and n 331; S Graham, ‘Conceptualizing space, place and information technology’ (1998) 22(2) 
Progress in Human Geography 178. 
 26 
 
accessible.227 Still others might combine an element of public accessibility with built-in 
(nested) capacity for private exchanges. Online access is also clearly contingent on privately-
owned internet infrastructure and a host of encumbrances mediate and distort the online user 
experience (from advertising algorithms to interventions by site moderators, and from platform 
specific rules to the tracking and harvesting of user data). Nonetheless, if we are accustomed 
to thinking of assemblies rigidly in terms of street demonstrations and parades, conjuring an 
image of ‘analogous interactions’ online – let alone ‘online assemblies’ – might involve quite 
an imaginative leap. However, if one accepts the elements of the definition of ‘assembly’ 
arrived at thus far – ‘an intentional gathering by two or more people (including in private 
spaces)’ – conceiving of assemblies online is not such a stretch. People intentionally gather 
with others online all the time (and such practices have been accentuated by the lockdown 
restrictions introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic). Obvious examples include 
video-conferencing, chat-rooms and multiplayer online gaming.228 These activities all involve 
intentional, synchronous coming together (though admittedly, a range of complex questions 
arise regarding the nature and threshold of participation).  
We can sift out many forms of online interaction that are essentially forms of expression. 
Any collective online activity that primarily involves publishing, disseminating or sharing 
information might be regarded as primarily expressive. The linking of messages by hashtag is 
also fundamentally expressive – even if, as Zizi Papacharissi argues, hashtags ‘serve as framing 
devices that allow crowds to be rendered into publics ….’229 But, as has been argued, the rights 
of assembly and expression are not mutually exclusive. The critical task is to identify when 
‘assembly’ might additionally or alternatively be engaged – when people intend primarily to 
gather – to be present – with others, and when any speech is incidental or secondary to such 
gathering.230 
It might be countered that it is precisely the act of ‘gathering’ that cannot be achieved 
online. In other words, whatever it is that people may do in common online, the physical 
dislocation of online interaction remains the antithesis of ‘gathering’. The weight attached in 
Paulo Gerbaudo’s work to bodily ‘density’,231 in Timothy Zick’s conceptualization of 
‘expressive topography’ to the proximity, tactility and physicality of assembling in material 
public places,232 and in Judith Butler’s performative theory of assembly of ‘bodily proximity’ 
might appear to support such scepticism. However, reflecting more closely on the nature of 
online space and its interconnection with the physical world suggests that online assemblies 
(‘by people’ rather than ‘of people’)233 should also be regarded as embodied gatherings. 
Most significantly, our personal, social and professional lives are constituted through and 
configured by the intersection of the offline and online, physical and virtual. The emergence of 
a scholarly consensus (bridging the fields of geography, sociology, and law and technology) 
suggests that such spaces should not be seen as detached from one another, but as 
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fundamentally interwoven. Actions and relations in one orient actions and relations in the other, 
and this inter-connection is not linear or serial but sporadic and parallel. As such, virtual spaces 
inhere within the physical world. Julie Cohen, for example, rejects understandings of 
cyberspace as separate space – defined in relation to real space, but existing apart from it –  
arguing that such a perspective both ‘denies the embodied spatiality of cyberspace users, who 
are situated in both spaces at once’ and ‘overlooks the complex interplay between real-space 
geographies of power and their cyberspace equivalents.’234 This emphasis on embodied 
experiences online suggests a point of alignment with Judith Butler’s performative theory of 
assembly for Butler similarly recognizes that ‘the body is not isolated from all those conditions, 
technologies, and life processes that make it possible’.235 
Given our doctrinal concern with the meaning and scope of the term ‘assembly’, the 
emphasis in this scholarship on the profoundly blended nature of offline and online spaces 
might lead us to question whether it is even appropriate to insist on ‘analogous’ interactions 
(for doing so implies a separation). Nonetheless, we can still ask whether gatherings that 
involve no corporeal presence ought to constitute an ‘assembly’ for the purposes of Article 21. 
Significantly, this involves a much more modest enquiry than, for example, Gerbaudo’s 
concern about whether online interactions can effectively sustain long-term social movements, 
or Zick’s concern that the emotive quality of assembling in material spaces may simply not be 
replicable in virtual places.236 One can, without contradiction, admit online assemblies into the 
Article 21 fold even if sympathetic to Müller’s conclusion that ‘assembly in physical space 
fulfills functions for democracy that online activity, however permanent or passionate, simply 
cannot’.237 
The argument in favour of such an inclusive approach to the meaning of ‘assembly’ is 
further strengthened by the example of hologram protests.238 In particular, these actions suggest 
how digital and technological developments might further blur the line between disembodied 
and embodied gatherings. We might initially think of hologram protests as disembodied 
simulations, little different from protest ‘installations’ such as the 2012 toy protest staged in 
Barnaul, Siberia,239 or the 11,000 pairs of shoes placed in the vicinity of the 2015 UN Climate 
Change Conference (COP21) in Paris.240 These of course were not assemblies but acts of 
expression in lieu of an assembly. Furthermore, it might seem ironic (or self-defeating) to 
suggest that such hologram protests should be considered as assemblies – in both Madrid and 
Seoul the point was precisely that these were not real assemblies by real people, but ‘ghost 
protests’ whose participants lacked rights (including the right to assemble). 
Hologram protests, however, defy straightforward categorization – indeed, they occupy a 
virtual space that is not online.241 The digital renderings in Madrid and Seoul were created 
using professionally recorded (physical) participants in combination with thousands of 
crowdsourced slogans, photos and videos from around the world.242 While we might still side 
with the view that these are disembodied actions (falling within the ambit of expression but not 
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assembly), as holographic technologies develop, becoming less costly and more widely 
available, real time holographic protests could realize a shift from the disembodied screening 
of prior recordings to embodied live projections.  
A definition of assembly need not attempt to instantiate a particular vision of what such 
online assemblies might look like in the future, but any definition should not foreclose the 
possibility that the parameters of Article 21 might thus be extended, and there is normative 





The enquiry into what constitutes an ‘assembly’ in international human rights law is both more 
important and more complicated than it first appears. Given in particular the need to coherently 
explain when the right of peaceful assembly is actually engaged (either alone or in combination 
with other rights) – to ascertain, in other words, what activities fall within the protective scope 
of Article 21 – it is vital to consider the different elements that might comprise a definition. 
Attempts to compartmentalize activities either as expression, association or assembly often 
run aground in light of the substantive overlap between these rights. Nonetheless, this article 
has sought to develop an inclusive approach to the meaning of ‘assembly’, ultimately 
suggesting that an ‘assembly’ might best be defined as ‘an intentional gathering by two or more 
people (including in private and online/virtual spaces).’ 
It has been argued that the scope of Article 21 should extend beyond political gatherings 
– given in particular the impossibility of determining what precisely the ‘political’ might 
embrace, the value of avowedly non-political events to a politics of stimulation, and the ready 
possibility of weighing such considerations when scrutinizing the necessity and proportionality 
of restrictions. In consequence, there should be no assumed – let alone expressly stated – 
hierarchy of protection. 
Finally, it has been argued that in spatial terms a definition of ‘assembly’ does not require 
anything beyond an openness to gatherings in private and online spaces – and that the 
particularities of access should be resolved on a case-by-case basis rather than at the level of 
definition. Crucially, an inclusive approach to determining the meaning and scope of 
‘assembly’ does not weaken the hand of State authorities – nothing in the argument precludes 
the legitimate restriction of assemblies (where such restrictions are necessary and 
proportionate). Rather, it simply ensures that any restrictions on an ‘assembly’ must survive 
appropriate scrutiny. The shift by the UN Human Rights Committee towards an inclusive 
definition of ‘assembly’ in the text of General Comment No 37 (in particular, during its second 
reading) is welcome. This landmark document will provide the normative scaffolding for all 
who seek to gather for many years to come. 
 
 
